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NOTE
UNFIT FOR PRIME TIME: WHY CABLE TELEVISION
REGULATIONS CANNOT PERFORM

TRINKO'S

"ANTITRUST FUNCTION"
Keith Klovers*
Until recently, regulation and antitrust law operated in tandem to safeguard
competition in regulated industries. In three recent decisions-Trinko,Credit
Suisse, and Linkline-the Supreme Court limited the operation of the antitrust laws when regulation "performs the antitrust function." This Note
argues that cable programming regulations-which are in some respects
factually similar to the telecommunications regulations at issue in Trinko
and Linkline-do not perform the antitrustfunction because they cannot
deter anticompetitive conduct. As a result, Trinko and its siblings should
not foreclose antitrustclaims for damages that arise out of certain cable
programmingdisputes.
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INTRODUCTION

Lawsuits involving regulated industries form the foundation of the modem American antitrust canon. The famous Standard Oil case revolved

largely around railroad shipping rates,' which were highly regulated by the
U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission.' More recently, the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") obtained the breakup of AT&T, a telephone
monopoly closely regulated by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or the "Commission"). 3 The rule seemed clear: regulated
industries were subject to the antitrust laws. 4

Over the past seven years, a string of Supreme Court decisions have
challenged this orthodoxy. In Verizon CommunicationsInc. v. Law Offices of
Curtis V Trinko, LLP,5 the Supreme Court ruled that certain refusal to deal

antitrust claims against Verizon-a successor to the former AT&T monopoly-were legally incognizable. 6 Although the Court grounded its decision in
narrow language regarding the type of duty to deal,7 it also identified several
factors that, together, suggested that the antitrust laws were unnecessarily
1. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1911).
2. The Interstate Commerce Commission, created in 1887, was charged with regulating
railroad rates and ensuring that railroads did not discriminate against small shippers by granting
rebates to larger shippers. See Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379.
3. See United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F Supp. 131, 211-12 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) (mem.) (rejecting the notion that "there
may be a conflict between the proposed [consent] decree and regulation by the Federal Communications Commission").
4. See id. at 157 ("As the Court previously stated, regulation under the Communications Act is neither sufficiently explicit nor sufficiently pervasive to allow it to stand in the
way of the enforcement of the antitrust laws." (footnote omitted)).
5. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
6. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410 ("We conclude that Verizon's alleged insufficient assistance
in the provision of service to rivals is not a recognized antitrust claim under this Court's existing refusal-to-deal precedents.").
7. See id. at 410-11 (finding that the refusal to deal "is not a recognized antitrust
claim" and declining to expand the scope of existing claims).
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duplicative of state and federal regulation.8 Since Trinko, the Supreme Court
has also ruled that antitrust law may be muted by either (1) the existence of

a regulation that "performs the antitrust function"9 or (2) a regulatory structure that is "clearly incompatible" with the antitrust laws. 10 Taken together,
Trinko and its siblings announce a broad shift in the way the Court views the

relationship between regulation and antitrust law.
Lower courts and scholars have struggled to define the new boundary
between antitrust law and regulation. Some scholars writing soon after the

decision argued that Trinko may limit antitrust claims against a wide range
of regulated entities.11 More recent scholarship has proposed narrow excep-

tions to Trinko, including, for example, exceptions for industries undergoing

deregulation. 2 The Court seemed to confirm this expansive view (at least in
part) in Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline Communications, Inc., which
used a "straightforward application" of Trinko to limit certain antitrust

claims in the internet access industry.13 Yet Linkline arose under the same
statute as Trinko-the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("Telecommunica-

tions Act") 14-and thus sheds little light on the application of Trinko's prinprinciples to industries, such as cable television, whose regulatory statutes
prescribe more limited regulatory authority. 5 And as the Court noted in
Trinko itself, "Antitrust analysis must sensitively recognize and reflect the
distinctive economic and legal setting of the regulated industry to which it
'6
applies."'

8. See id. at 411-14 ("The 1996 [Telecommunications] Act's extensive provision for
[FCC-regulated] access makes it unnecessary to impose a judicial doctrine of forced access.").
9. See id. at 412 (quoting Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 358 (1963) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S.
Ct. 1109, 1119 (2009) (extending Trinko's logic to cover internet service providers accused of
a "price squeeze" antitrust violation).
10. See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007) (extending Trinko's logic to cover stock underwriters accused of "laddering" and "tying" violations).
11. See, e.g., Adam Candeub, Trinko and Re-Grounding the Refusal to Deal Doctrine,
66 U. PITT. L. REV. 821, 822 (2005) (arguing that Trinko could affect "Internet broadband
access and the open cable system debates [and] the satellite and electricity industries" (footnote omitted)); John Thorne, A Categorical Rule Limiting Section 2 of the Sherman Act:
Verizon v. Trinko, 72 U. CM. L. REV. 289 (2005).
12. See Howard A. Shelanski, The Case for Rebalancing Antitrust and Regulation, 109
MICH. L. REV. 683, 685 (2011).
13. See Linkline, 129 S. Ct. at 1119-20 (extending Trinko to cover a different type of
claim- "price squeezes"-in the internet access industry).
14. Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
15. For example, Trinko noted that the Telecommunications Act grants the FCC wide
authority to impose sharing requirements and to regulate the price of shared inputs. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 405-06 (describing UNE regulation). By contrast, the Cable Act does not
impose such far-reaching requirements. See infra Section lI.B.
16. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411 (quoting Town of Concord v. Bos. Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17,
22 (1 st Cir. 1990)).

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 110:489

Applying this individualized analysis, federal district courts have split
on whether Trinko's logic extends to limit antitrust claims against cable
companies. One court extended Trinko to foreclose even antitrust claims
not created by regulation;" another refused to apply Trinko even to a refusal-to-deal claim. 8 And a trio of related decisions suggest that Trinko
may apply to the cable industry. 9 No U.S. court of appeals has yet considered the question.
This Note argues that Trinko and its siblings should not be read to displace judicially enforced antitrust law in the cable industry because

existing FCC regulations cannot perform Trinko's "antitrust function."20
Part I reviews the pre-Trinko era and summarizes Trinko and the subsequent decisions in Linkline and Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v.
Billing.2' Part I concludes that regulated industries that do not satisfy the

tests in Trinko and its siblings remain subject to cognizable antitrust
claims. Part II argues for a deterrence-based definition of Trinko's "anti-

trust function." Applying this definition to cable television regulations that
are facially similar to the telecommunications regulations in Trinko and
Linkline, Part II concludes that cable television regulation does not "per-

form[] the antitrust function" and thus cannot displace antitrust law. Part
III attempts to clarify Trinko's teachings in light of the case's potential
application to the cable industry. Part III thus proposes to focus Trinko's

"antitrust function" test more clearly on whether the overlapping regulato-

ry regime is sufficient to deter anticompetitive conduct in practice. Part III

then argues that when regulatory deterrence is inadequate, as2 in the cable
industry, regulation should not bar antitrust suits for damages.

17. See Mediacom Commc'ns Corp. v. Sinclair Broad. Grp., Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1012,
1028-29 (S.D. Iowa 2006) (following Trinko in finding that regulation modified and implicitly
immunized conduct that might otherwise constitute tying, a violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act).
18. See N.Y. Jets LLC v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., No. 05 Civ. 2875(HB), 2005 WL
2649330, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2005) (recognizing the viability of refusal to deal claims
against a cable operator "when the purpose of [the] refusal is to maintain a monopoly").
Although the court did not address the matter, the case is legally distinct from Trinko because
the duty to deal does not arise from regulation. Id.
19. See Marchese v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., No. 10-2190 (JLL), 2010 WL 3311842, at
*2 n.2 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2010) (distinguishing Trinko on legal and factual grounds, yet not
foreclosing its application to the cable industry); Parsons v. Bright House Networks, L.L.C.,
No. 2:09-cv-0267-AKK, 2010 WL 5094258, at *8 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 23, 2010) (noting the defendant's contention that Trinko does not bar all antitrust claims in the cable industry, but
rejecting defendant's attempt to invoke Trinko on factual grounds); In re Cox Enters., Inc., No.
09-ML-2048-C, 2010 WL 5136047, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Jan. t9, 2010) (distinguishing Trinko,
but not foreclosing its application to the cable industry).
20. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412.
21. 551 U.S. 264 (2007).
22. My conclusion does not suggest that antitrust claims against cable operators will
necessarily prevail in court. Rather, I conclude only that Trinko and its siblings do not bar such
claims as a matter of law.
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I. TRINKO, LINKLINE, AND CREDIT SUISSE REDEFINE
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANTITRUST
AND REGULATION

Since Trinko was decided in 2004, scholars have debated how far the
Court should go in shielding regulated firms from antitrust scrutiny.23 This
debate has intensified since the decisions in Credit Suisse and Linkline. Although Trinko is somewhat ambiguous in isolation, the Court's reasoning and
future direction become clearer when the case is analyzed alongside
Linkline and CreditSuisse.
This Part interprets Trinko in light of the Court's recent guidance in
those decisions. Section L.A provides a quick primer on the antitrust laws at
issue in the three cases and illuminates the different legal standards that apply in each case. Section I.B surveys the historical (pre-Trinko) relationship
between antitrust law and regulation. Section I.C reviews Trinko, Linkline,
and Credit Suisse and identifies the circumstances under which regulation
supplants antitrust law.
A. A Primeron U.S. Antitrust Laws
American antitrust laws prohibit anticompetitive activity by firms acting
either alone or coordinately. 4 Coordinated anticompetitive activity ("collusion") is prohibited by section 1 of the Sherman Act ("Section 1"), which
states that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. 2' 5 Generally, firms violate
Section 1 any time they coordinate their activities with the intent to restrain
trade and increase prices.26 Coordinated acts may be condemned either as
per se violations of the antitrust laws27 or under a "rule of reason" analysis
that weighs the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of the conduct. 8

23. Compare Candeub, supra note 11 (arguing that Trinko should not be read to impair
the operation of antitrust law in regulated industries), with Thome, supra note II (arguing that
Trinko suggests a "categorical rule" limiting the application of antitrust law in regulated indus-

tries).
24. See generally Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2006) (prohibiting "every contract
..in restraint of trade" as well as monopolization and attempted monopolization of the trade
in any product).
25. Id. § 1.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1940)
(finding that "the law does not permit an inquiry into" the reasonableness of price-fixing arrangements and that all such agreements are "banned because of their actual or potential threat
to the central nervous system of the economy").
27. E.g., id. at 218 ("[P]rice-fixing agreements are unlawful per se under the Sherman
Act.").
28. E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61-62 (1911) (stating that the
"rule of reason" guides Section 1 inquiries).

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 110:489

Other antitrust laws, most notably section 2 of the Sherman Act ("Section 2"), prohibit a firm from unilaterally "monopolizing" a market.2 9 To
monopolize a market, a firm must have "monopoly power," which is generally characterized as the ability to profit by unilaterally raising prices.3" All
monopolization claims are evaluated using a "rule of reason" analysis. 3 Antitrust laws condemn 32those practices that, on balance, harm consumers by
harming competition.
B. The TraditionalView of Antitrust and
Regulation as Complements

Traditionally, antitrust law has operated alongside regulation, including rate and access regulation. For example, antitrust law and regulation
were applied in tandem in 1912 in the foundational case United States v.
Terminal Railroad Ass'n of St. Louis.33 Terminal Railroad concerned the

monopolization of access to railroad bridges and ferries crossing the Mississippi River into St. Louis by a joint venture of several leading
railways. 34 The joint venture foreclosed competitors' access to the crossings, 35 prompting its competitors to file an antitrust suit in federal court.
The Court found this denial of access anticompetitive. 36 It ordered injunctive relief granting new members nondiscriminatory access to the
crossings. 37 Mindful of the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission
to regulate railroad rates, terms, and conditions of service, however, the
Court concluded that the resulting consent decree should contain a savings
clause recognizing and preserving "the power of the Interstate Commerce
Commission over the rates to be charged by the Terminal Company ...or
any other power conferred by law upon such Commission."38 In other words,
the Court explicitly allowed the antitrust laws to operate alongside regulation.
29.

Specifically, Section 2 of the Sherman Act laid the foundation for the prohibition of

monopolies by prohibiting certain unilateral anticompetitive conduct. See 15 U.S.C. § 2. Over
the years, Congress has added additional prohibitions. See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(2006); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006); Robinson-Patman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 13 (2006); Celler-Kefauver Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
30. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Cellophane), 351 U.S.
377, 391 (1956) ("Monopoly power is the power to control prices or exclude competition."
(footnote omitted)).
31. StandardOil, 221 U.S. at 61-62 (noting the applicability of the "rule of reason" to
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act); see also Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S.
231, 238 (1918) (establishing the "rule of reason" as an individualized inquiry).
32.

Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246 U.S. at 238.

33.
34.
35.

224 U.S. 383 (1912).
TenninalR.R., 224 U.S. at 391-98.
See id. at 406-09 (discussing the terminal railroad's anticompetitive conduct).

36.
37.

Id. at410-12.
Id. at 411-12.

38.

Id. at412.
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The Court also recognized the complementary nature of antitrust law
and regulation in other industries. In 1973, the Court in Otter Tail Power Co.

v. United States found that antitrust laws operate alongside regulation in the
electric power industry.3 9 Otter Tail, an incumbent generator and distributor
of electricity, refused to sell wholesale access to its electricity distribution

system to local municipalities that sought to enter the market for retail electricity sales.40 It argued that, as a firm regulated by the Federal Power

Commission, it was exempt from antitrust scrutiny.4 Rejecting this claim,
the Court concluded that "[a]ctivities which come under the jurisdiction of a
regulatory agency nevertheless may be subject to scrutiny under the antitrust
laws,' 42 unless such regulatory regimes were "intended to be a substitute
for... antitrust regulation. '43 Finding no evidence that the regulation was
intended to supplant antitrust law,44 the Court affirmed a finding of antitrust
liability and held that the district court had the power to supervise Otter
Tail's future conduct vis-a-vis municipalities seeking to enter the power
45
market .
Terminal Railroad and Otter Tail provided a "well settled" rule that reg-

ulated entities remained subject to the antitrust laws.46 Under this rule,47
antitrust law applied in the presence or absence of explicit price regulation
as long as the given regulation did not explicitly supplant antitrust regulation.48 Antitrust remedies-which in these cases compelled access at
regulated or unregulated prices-were deemed necessary complements to

39.

410U.S. 366 (1973).
40. Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 370-71.
41.
Id. at 372.
42. Id. But see City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 955 F.2d 641, 656 (10th
Cir. 1992) (distinguishing Otter Tail and finding no antitrust duty to deal where the regulatory
regime required,rather than encouraged, certain commercial arrangements with rivals), overruledby Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Labs. Corp., 117 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1997).
43. Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 374-75.
44. Id. ("Thus, there is no basis [in the legislative history] for concluding that the limited authority of the Federal Power Commission to order interconnections was intended to be
a substitute for, or to immunize Otter Tail from, antitrust regulation for refusing to deal with
municipal corporations.").
45. Id. at 381-82.
46. See Town of Concord v. Bos. Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1990) ("The
basic legal principles that govern this monopolization case are well settled. Even though Boston Edison is a regulated firm, it has no blanket immunity from the antitrust laws." (citing
Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 372-75)); see also Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 596
n.35 (1976) ("[S]ince our decision in Otter Tail ... there can be no doubt about the proposition that the federal antitrust laws are applicable to electrical utilities.").
47. Compare United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 412
(1912) (price regulation present through the Interstate Commerce Commission), with Otter
Tail, 410 U.S. at 372-75 (price regulation absent; Federal Power Commission retains authority
to require interconnection in only limited circumstances).
48. Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 374-75.
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the existing regulatory regime. 49 Federal judges, including future Justice
Stephen Breyer, continued to follow the Otter Tail decision and the rule it

announced.50
The application of antitrust law alongside regulation reflected, in large
part, the Court's historical view of antitrust law as a key policy tool. This
sentiment is exemplified by the Court's famous announcement in United
States v. Topco Associates: "Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act
in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important
to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as
the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms."'" This view remained unquestioned for many years5 2 and, as the
subsequent Otter Tail decision indicates, extended even to regulated industries.53
C. Trinko and Its Siblings Redefine Antitrust Law
and Regulation as Substitutes

The Court has announced a far different view of the relationship between antitrust law and regulation in recent years. The Court no longer

follows the maxim that "[r]epeals of the antitrust laws by implication from a
regulatory statute are strongly disfavored, and have only been found in cases
of plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions."54 Rather, the Court now holds that "[w]here regulatory statutes are silent in

respect to antitrust ... courts must determine whether, and in what respects,
they implicitly preclude application of the antitrust laws. '55 Despite the

Court's pronouncement that the antitrust laws remain the "Magna Carta of
free enterprise,"56 they are now mutable by either compatible or incompati-

49. See id. at 381-82 (compelling interconnection and wholesale sales on terms supervised by the district court); Terminal R.R., 224 U.S. at 411-12 (compelling access on the same
rates enjoyed by current members).
50. See Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 21 (Breyer, C.J.) (applying "[t]he basic legal
principles" enumerated in Otter Tail).
51. 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
52. See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 632 (1992) (citing Topco for the
proposition that the preservation of the free market through antitrust enforcement "is essential
to economic freedom"); Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 538 n.38 (1983) (citing Topco for the proposition that the Sherman Act is "the
Magna Carta of free enterprise").
53. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text. Note that Otter Tail (1973) was
decided one year after Topco (1972).
54. Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 372 (quoting United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
321, 350-51 (1963)).
55. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 271 (2007).
56. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 415
(2004) (quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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ble regulatory regimes.17 Such preemption may occur even when antitrust
law and regulation would both forbid a given form of conduct.5 8 In short, the
presumed relationship between antitrust law and regulation has changed
from one of complements to one of substitutes.
1. Trinko, CreditSuisse, and Linkline

The Court's revised view of the relationship between regulation and
antitrust law was announced in three cases concerning regulated industries-Trinko (decided in 2004), Credit Suisse (2007), and Linkline (2009).
Trinko concerned antitrust claims brought in a consumer class action

against Verizon, the incumbent local exchange (telephone) carrier in New
York.59 The plaintiffs alleged that Verizon's violation of certain network-

sharing obligations-imposed by the FCC pursuant to the Telecommunications Act-also constituted an antitrust violation. 6° The Court found that

the antitrust claims were not cognizable for two reasons, one narrow and
one broad. First, the Court held that Verizon's "regulatory" duty to deal
was created under the Telecommunications Act, not the Sherman Act. 61 As
a result, the class's claims were not cognizable under the Sherman Act.
Second, the Court, in dicta, declined to recognize the consumer's antitrust

claims because the regulatory regime adequately performed "the antitrust
function" and thereby displaced antitrust law.62 As discussed below in Section II.A, the Court loosely outlined its conception of the "antitrust

function" in terms of its ability to punish and deter anticompetitive conduct.63
Credit Suisse concerned the securities market, an area regulated by the

Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). The case involved antitrust
claims brought against brokerage houses who engaged in various regulated
57. See Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 273 (discussing how securities law precluded the
operation of antitrust law in Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 691
(1975), even though both laws pointed to the same result). But see id. at 271-72 (noting how
the Supreme Court did not find preemption of antitrust laws in Silver v. New York Stock
Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963), because, in part, "nothing [was] built into the regulatory
scheme which performs the antitrust function of insuring that rules that injure competition are
nonetheless justified as furthering legitimate regulatory ends" (quoting Silver, 373 U.S. at 358)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
58. Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 273 ("The upshot is that, in light of potential future conflict, the Court found that the securities law precluded antitrust liability even in respect to a
practice that both antitrust law and securities law might forbid." (discussing Gordon, 422 U.S.
at 691).
59. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 402.
60. Id. at 404-05.
61. See id. at 410 (noting that "[t]he sharing obligation [was] imposed by the 1996 Act"
and that plaintiff's claim "is not a recognized antitrust claim under this Court's existing refusal-to-deal precedents").
62. Id. at413-16.
63. See infra Section ILA; see also Trinko, 540 U.S. at 413 (discussing the speed and
severity of FCC and state regulatory fines).
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underwriting practices. 6' Although the Court assumed that the conduct at
issue could have constituted violations of SEC regulations, it declined to
recognize the applicability of the antitrust laws. 65 The Court cited two primary concerns: (1) the risk that antitrust law could "seriously alter
underwriter conduct in undesirable ways" and (2) the "unusually small"
need for antitrust enforcement in the securities industry. 66 In doing so, the
Court refused to consider the effect of any statutory savings clause, 67 formerly a key factor that, under older precedent, would likely have preserved
68
antitrust claims.
Finally, Linkline, the most recent case, considered internet service infrastructure regulated by the FCC. Like Trinko, Linkline involved antitrust
claims arising from Telecommunications Act sharing duties; here these duties were imposed on a different incumbent local exchange carrier (and
another AT&T successor), Pacific Bell.6 9 Linkline extended the Trinko decision by finding that the only applicable duties to deal were imposed by
70
regulation (the Telecommunications Act), not by the antitrust laws.
Few scholars agree on the extent or scope of the changes wrought by the
Court's recent jurisprudence. To some scholars, the Court's recent decisions
represent a radical departure; 71 to others, they are merely a clarification of
the traditional view exemplified by Terminal Railroad and Otter Tail.72 The
ultimate scope of Trinko and other recent cases is also unclear. To Professor
John Thorne, Trinko stands for a "categorical rule" limiting the application
of antitrust laws in "duty to deal" cases involving the telecommunications

64.

Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 267 (2007).

65. Id. at 279.
66. Id. at 283.
67. Id. at 275 (refusing to "reexamine" antitrust savings clause arguments). But see id.
at 290 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("A straightforward application of the saving clauses to this
case leads to the conclusion that respondents' antitrust suits must proceed.").
68. See id. (arguing that the savings clause applies); United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank,
374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963) ("Repeals of the antitrust laws by implication from a regulatory
statute are strongly disfavored...." (footnote omitted)).
69. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1115-16
(2009).
70. Id. at 1123 (refusing to recognize "a new form of antitrust liability never before
recognized by this Court"). But see id. at 1118 (recognizing that an antitrust violation may
occur under "limited circumstances" where an antitrust duty to deal is found).
71. See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEx. L. REv. 685, 685-86 (2009) ("A cluster of Supreme Court decisions in the past
decade have fundamentally altered the relationship between antitrust and regulation, placing
antitrust law in a subordinate relationship .... "); Thorne, supra note 11 (finding a new "categorical rule").
72. See, e.g., James R. Weiss et al., Supreme Court Finds Implied Antitrust Immunity
for Certain Securities Industry Conduct: Implicationsfor Other Regulated Industries, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. ALERT (K&L Gates LLP, Del.), June 2007, at 3, available at
http://www.klgates.com/newsstand/Detail.aspx?publication=3914 (arguing that, due to changes in the state of power regulation, "application of Credit Suisse's four-factor incompatibility
test to the Otter Tail facts today might yield a different result").

December 2011]

Unfitfor Prime Time

industry.73 Other scholars interpret Trinko more narrowly.7 4 For example, Professor Adam Candeub argues that Trinko cannot be read to foreclose antitrust
claims based on vertical theories of foreclosure.75 And Professor Daniel Crane
provides yet another view that Trinko and Linkline speak less to the merits of
regulation or antitrust law than to the Court's "institutional suspicions," which
he suggests include a preference for public, technocratic enforcement over
76
private treble damage plaintiffs.
2. When Regulation Supplants Antitrust Law
Although the significance and scope of recent decisions is debatable,
Trinko, Linkline, and Credit Suisse announce a relatively clear test for determining when antitrust must yield to regulation. If read narrowly on their
facts, Trinko and Linkline suggest that antitrust claims based on newly created regulatory sharing duties are not cognizable. More generally, however,
Trinko, Linkline, and Credit Suisse hold that regulation that performs the
"antitrust function" supplants antitrust law.77 This holding would presumably extend to cable regulations, including those discussed in Part II, to the
extent that a cable firm's duty to deal with rivals arises solely from regulations and not from market dominance.78 Although some commentators
have questioned the Court's practical commitment to blanket regulatory

73. See Thorne, supra note 11, at 296-97 (noting that the challenges inherent to creating and policing telecommunications network sharing "historically have been left to
regulatory regimes, not the antitrust system").
74. See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and the
Internet: The Hidden Side of Trinko, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1822, 1907 (2007) (arguing that
Trinko may not bar all antitrust claims related to telecommunications and access requirements); Frank X. Schoen, Note, Exclusionary Conduct After Trinko, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1625,
1631 (2005) (proposing a narrow reading of Trinko focusing on a prior course of dealing).
75. Candeub, supra note I1, at 824 (arguing that "Trinko must be read to allow antitrust
law to adjudicate [vertical foreclosure] claims" concerning network industries).
76. Daniel A. Crane, LinkLine's Institutional Suspicions, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 20082009, at 111, 122-27.
77. See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
412-13 (2004) (providing the "antitrust function" language); Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v.
Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 270-71 (2007) (citing Trinko for the principle that regulation may explicitly or implicitly preclude the operation of antitrust law); Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline
Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1119 (2009) (adopting "[a] straightforward application of
our recent decision in Trinko").
78. Although not the focus of this Note, there may be sufficient evidence to support a
finding that cable operators have an antitrust duty to deal (rather than a regulatory duty to
deal) arising from their dominant distribution role in major cities. For example, the FCC has
long recognized vertically integrated cable firms' "incentive and ability" to discriminate
against independent programmers and rival distributors ("MVPDs"). E.g., Implementation of
the Cable Television Consumer Prot. & Competition Act of 1992, 22 FCC Rcd. 17,791,
17,841 para. 72 (2007) (report & order & notice) [hereinafter 2007 Program Access Rules],
aff'd sub nom. Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. FCC, 597 F.3d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The FCC believes that "the market share of the cable operator relative to other competitors" is the "key
consideration." Id.
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preemption of antitrust law,79 this Note takes Trinko and Credit Suisse at

their word that a regulation that "performs the antitrust function" may displace antitrust law.80

If the Court's broad language in Trinko and its siblings is taken at face
value, regulation may supplant antitrust law for either of two reasons. First,
Trinko and its siblings suggest that regulation may supplant antitrust law

when the two mechanisms would reach similar results.81 A regulation "performs the antitrust function" if it achieves traditional antitrust objectives in a
regulatory, rather than judicial,82 context. 83 Such regulation is "effective"-

and therefore sufficient to supplant the operation of antitrust law-if it
quickly adjudicates allegations of monopolistic abuse. 84 Second, antitrust

laws may be preempted if the regulation conflicts with the application of
antitrust laws. 85 Such conflicts have been most apparent in the securities
context, where antitrust law and securities regulation produce incompatible
requirements on financial firms. 86 Preemption is particularly likely where the

conduct in question lies "at the very heart" of a regulatory regime;87 when88
the law grants the regulator authority to supervise the parties' conduct;
where the regulator has "continuously exercised its legal authority to regulate" activity similar to the challenged conduct; 89 and where the regulator

79. See Christine A. Varney, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in this Challenging Era, Remarks at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, at 11
n.22 (May 12, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/
245777.pdf) (arguing that "there is no question" that Trinko and Linkline allow antitrust law to
reach regulated firms).
80. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412 (quoting Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 358
(1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S.
264, 271-72 (2007) (quoting Silver, 373 U.S. at 358) (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. See CreditSuisse, 551 U.S. at 278-79 (accepting that "both securities law and antitrust law aim to prohibit the same undesirable activity," but nonetheless foreclosing antitrust
claims); Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412, 415 (noting that the regulations were "much more ambitious
than the antitrust laws").
82. I use "judicial" for simplicity when discussing traditional methods of adjudicating
antitrust disputes. This term includes Federal Trade Commission adjudications, suits by the
U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division, and private antitrust suits.
83. Cf Trinko, 540 U.S. at 413 (describing FCC and state regulatory actions that collectively showed that "the [regulatory] regime was an effective steward of the antitrust
function").
84. Cf id. (discussing how "the FCC and PSC responded" to rivals' complaints, that the
FCC "soon concluded that Verizon was in breach," and that the state regulators "found Verizon
in violation of [its obligations] even earlier" (emphasis added)).
85. CreditSuisse, 551 U.S. at 273, 285 ("[T]he securities law precluded antitrust liability even in respect to a practice that both antitrust law and securities law might forbid."
(discussing Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975))).
86. See id. at 275-76 (summarizing Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659
(1975), and United States v. Nat'l Ass'n. of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975)).
87.

See id. at 276.

88.
89.

See id. at 275-77.

Id.
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may consider competitive dynamics as part of its regulatory policy. 90 Other
factors also remain in play, as "[a]ntitrust analysis must sensitively recognize and reflect the distinctive economic and legal setting of the regulated
industry to which it applies." 91
In summary, Trinko and its siblings-if read broadly and taken at
face value-represent a significant departure from past precedent. Regulatory regimes have implicitly supplanted (Trinko and Linkline) or explicitly
preempted (Credit Suisse) judicially enforced antitrust law. In each case,
a central question was whether the regulatory apparatus alone was sufficient to achieve the level of competition that the antitrust laws seek to

maintain.
II.

CABLE TELEVISION REGULATIONS CANNOT PERFORM
THE ANTITRUST FUNCTION

The telecommunications industry has been at the heart of the recent
debate on the proper relationship between antitrust and regulation.92 Sev-

eral factors may explain this industry's relative importance in the
regulation-and-antitrust canon. First, the telecommunications industry is a
significant part of the American economy, accounting for billions of dollars
annually in revenue. 93 Second, certain sectors of the telecommunications
industry have been considered natural monopolies. 94 For example, AT&T

operated the nation's local telephone network as a natural monopoly for
much of the twentieth century.95 Similarly, cable companies have faced
little competition over the past forty years.96 Third, perhaps owing to the
90. Id. at 283 (finding that "any enforcement-related need for an antitrust lawsuit is
unusually small" because "the SEC is itself required to take account of competitive considerations when it creates securities-related policy and embodies it in rules and regulations").
91. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411
(2004) (quoting Town of Concord v. Bos. Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
92. Both Trinko and Linkline concerned the applicability of the Sherman Act to regulatory duties supervised by the FCC. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct.
1109, 1115 (2009) (concerning DSL internet transmission service); Trinko, 540 U.S. at 401
(concerning Telecommunications Act sharing obligations in the telephone industry).
93. The FCC's most recent data (from 2005) estimates total cable industry revenues at
$65.7 billion. FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF THE STATUS OF COMPETITION IN THE MARKET FOR THE DELIVERY OF VIDEO PROGRAMMING 22 para. 46 (2009)
(Thirteenth Annual Report), reprinted in 24 FCC Rcd. 542, 563 para. 46 [hereinafter THIRTEENTH MVPD REPORT].

94. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS iX (2007)
(discussing industries once "thought to be natural monopolies").
95. See United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd sub
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) (mem.) (excepting from the settlement
certain "natural monopoly" services that AT&T previously provided). See generally FRED W.
HENCK & BERNARD STRASSBURG, A SLIPPERY SLOPE: THE LONG ROAD TO THE BREAKUP OF
AT&T (1988) (detailing AT&T's history).
96. See, e.g., Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub.
L. No. 102-385, § 2(a)(2), 106 Stat. 1460, 1460 ("Without the presence of another [cable or
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past natural monopolies in telecommunications, the industry is regulated
by the FCC. 97

At first glance, the technological and legal similarities among the telephone, internet, and cable industries may suggest that the principles in
Trinko and its siblings also apply to the cable television industry. Specifically, telephone, internet, and cable services have converged to the point where
they increasingly overlap. 98 As a result of technological convergence and

regulatory liberalization, cable companies (such as Comcast, Time Warner
Cable, and others) and telephone carriers (such as Verizon and AT&T) compete to offer a "triple play" of cable, internet, and telephone services. 99

Reflecting this convergence, courts and regulators have increasingly applied
legal doctrines uniformly across the three services. l°
This Part argues that Trinko and its siblings, despite the superficial simi-

larities between their facts and the conditions in the cable industry, should
not be extended to immunize all refusals to deal by vertically integrated cable firms because FCC cable regulations do not "perform[] the antitrust
function. 1 1 Specifically, this Part suggests that the FCC's existing cable
television regulations have not been able to, and cannot, effectively punish
and deter anticompetitive behavior. Section II.A briefly defines the "antitrust
function," including the centrality of deterrence and punishment in the modsatellite provider], a cable system faces no local competition."); S. REP. No. 102-92, at 24
(1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1157 (noting testimony that "in most cities, the
cable system is a local monopoly" (internal quotation marks omitted)); FED. COMMC'NS
COMM'N, FACT SHEET: CABLE TELEVISION INFORMATION BULLETIN (2000), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/mb/facts/csgen.html (noting that FCC and local regulations of cable firms
have been in place since at least 1965, suggesting their natural monopoly status). Cable firms
retain monopoly-like market shares today. See, e.g., Applications for Consent to the Assignment and/or Transfer of Control of Licenses, 21 FCC Rcd. 8,203, 8,349-50 app. D para. 28

tbl. A-2 (2006) (mem. opinion & order) [hereinafter Adelphia Order] (showing Comcast or
Time Warner Cable market shares of over 80 percent in several large television markets).
97. E.g., Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 passim
(amending the scope of FCC regulation of the cable industry by adding, modifying, and eliminating various requirements); United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968)
(holding that the FCC has the authority to "regulat[e] ... CATV [cable] systems").
98. See, e.g., THIRTEENTH MVPD REPORT, supra note 93, at 545 para. 6 (noting the
expansion of cable, telephone, and broadband service firms into adjacent markets).
99. E.g., id. (discussing how cable operators, broadband service providers, and telephone companies all offer competing "triple play" products).
100. See, e.g., Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1119
(2009) (providing a "straightforward application" of Trinko). As noted above, Linkline concemed internet service, id. at 1115, whereas Trinko concerned telephone service, Verizon
Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 401 (2003). In the
regulatory context, see Review of the Commission's Program Access Rules and Examination
of Programming Tying Arrangements, 25 FCC Rcd. 746, 771-72 para. 36 (2010) (first report
& order) [hereinafter Philadelphia Order], for a discussion of how continuing to allow the
terrestrial loophole, described infra Section II.B. 1, "would undermine the goal of promoting
the deployment of advanced [broadband] services that Congress established as a priority for
the Commission."
101. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412 (quoting Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 358
(1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ern antitrust scheme. Section II.B argues that present FCC cable regulations

lack key attributes of an effective antitrust regime. This analysis in particular
identifies (1) slow adjudicative processes and (2) inherent limits on regulatory fines-and thus on deterrence-as key shortcomings of cable television

regulation. 10 2 This Section concludes that, despite appearing to meet the
Trinko standard of effective regulation, the FCC's cable television regula-

tions are a poor substitute for the antitrust laws.
A. Defining the Antitrust Function
Congress enacted the antitrust laws for two reasons: to "punish past, and
to deter future, unlawful conduct."' 3 Although there is some debate on the
proper purposes and goals of antitrust law,' °4 the prevailing viewreaffirmed by the Court in Trinko° 5-places punishment and deterrence at

the heart of the antitrust function. 10 6 To achieve these goals, the antitrust
laws authorize the imposition of injunctions, monetary penalties, and damage awards. 107 Damages are often seen as the key antitrust enforcement

102. Slow-moving regulations are not exactly unique to the cable industry. To the extent
that regulators elsewhere (and particularly in the telephone and internet industries) have recognized anticompetitive conduct for years and failed to act (whether due to perceived lack of
power or simply inertia), the cable industry may not separate so cleanly from Trinko and
Linkline. Considering the speed and force of regulatory action in Trinko, see infra Section
IIB, existing case law in regulated industries is probably distinguishable from the sluggish
pace of adjudications in the cable space.
103. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 786
(2000) (quoting Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc. 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); accordAm. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456
U.S. 556, 572 (1982) ("A principal purpose of the antitrust private cause of action ... is, of
course, to deter anticompetitive practices."); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,
429 U.S. 477,485-86 (1977).
104. See RICHARDA. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 2-3 (2d ed. 2001) (arguing that although
efficiency is the primary goal of antitrust law, it is achieved through deterrence and compensation); Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing PrivateAntitrust Enforcement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 675, 677
(2010) (arguing that "[pirivate antitrust in the United States has rarely advanced the two assumed goals of private enforcement: deterrence and compensation"); William H. Page, The
Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1445, 1452 (1985) (arguing that
private antitrust law should be primarily concerned with deterrence, and that compensation
should be merely a secondary objective).
105. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412 (finding little benefit to applying antitrust law when "a
regulatory structure designed to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm" exists).
106. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res., 529 U.S. at 786 (finding that treble damages are
designed to "punish past, and to deter future, unlawful conduct" (quoting Tex. Indus. Inc., 451
U.S. 630, 639 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION
COMM'N, supra note 94, at 1 ("The antitrust laws seek to deter or eliminate anticompetitive
restraints that impede free-market competition.").
107. Generally, "penalties" are paid to public enforcement agencies such as the DOJ
Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission; "damages" are paid to private plaintiffs. ROBERT PITOFSKY, HARVEY J. GOLDSCHMID & DIANE P. WOOD, TRADE REGULATION 5455 (6th ed. 2010) (noting private treble damage and public (government) fine and penalty
remedies). Disgorgement, although not usually sought as a remedy, may also be available to
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tool.1" 8 Although the optimal size of damage awards (single, double, or tre-

ble) has been endlessly debated, few scholars believe that the antitrust goals
could be achieved without the ability to impose damages at least commensurate to the anticompetitive harm. 10 9
Trinko itself suggests that sizeable monetary sanctions and speedy regu-

latory adjudication are both necessary to deter anticompetitive conduct.
Trinko suggests that a regulator may perform "the antitrust function" only
when it "provide[s] a strong financial incentive for . .. compliance" that

prevents "backsliding."' 10 This concern is consistent with extensive scholarship that suggests that optimal deterrence is achieved when the size of the
penalty eliminates the financial incentive to engage in anticompetitive behavior. 111 Trinko also suggests that deterrence is achieved by speedy action.
Specifically, a regulator is an "effective steward of the antitrust function" if
it acts "soon" to assess a violation, impose penalties, and monitor remediation. 112 Congress provided the regulatory penalties discussed in Trinko to
provide an "effective deterrent" to anticompetitive conduct." 3 Trinko thus
suggests that regulations cannot deter anticompetitive activity, and thus perform the "antitrust function," if they cannot impose sufficient financial
penalties and cannot do so quickly.
B. Why Cable Television Regulations Are Inadequate
Recent experience suggests that regulation may not perform the antitrust
function if regulators do not act to correct an apparent harm to competition.
Scholars have identified at least two limitations. First, regulators may decline to curb an apparent competitive abuse if they are unsure whether their

successful litigants. Einer Elhauge, Disgorgementas an Antitrust Remedy, 76 ANTITRUST L.J.
79 (2009).
108. See, e.g., ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, supra note 94, at 241 ("With respect to private civil actions, .. . the availability of treble damages has been ... lauded as the
key to an effective enforcement system... .").
109. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1,
31 (1989) ("Given the existence of [injuries to competitors], there is little to justify a rule
denying a damages action to competitors, provided that the damages are measured properly.").
110. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 413 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The
Court's discussion centers upon the extent of FCC and state regulations, which it characterizes
as "an effective steward of the antitrust function." Id.
111. See generally Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance,
and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD, 1, 13 (1974) ("Private triple damage suits
have become the only effective sanction of the antitrust laws."); George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526 (1970).
112. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 413 (noting the speed of state and federal regulatory investigations and sanctions).
113. See S. REP. No. 95-580, at 8 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 109, 116 (expressing the Committee's resolve to raise forfeiture limits because the preexisting limits "are
unrealistic and totally inadequate to deter large communications businesses"). The FCC did
impose forfeiture penalties ($3 million) resulting from the breach at issue in Trinko. Trinko,
540 U.S. at 403-04.
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4
statutory authority encompasses the particular anticompetitive conduct.'1
Second, even if regulators decide (and courts affirm) that they have the power to remedy a competitive problem through regulation, the regulator may
decline to act for a variety of reasons, including "regulatory capture"' 5 and
evidentiary concerns." 16 As described in the Section below, the FCC's han-

dling of a cable television provision commonly known as the "terrestrial
loophole" exemplifies both problems." 17
1. The FCC's Terrestrial Loophole
The terrestrial loophole grew out of congressional efforts to increase com-

petition in the cable television marketplace. Under the Cable Act of 1992,'18
Congress specifically granted the FCC authority to promote competition in the
cable television industry." 9 Concerned with increasing vertical integration in
the cable industryl 2 -- the arrangement whereby a cable company owns (1)

the connections to its consumers' houses and (2) critical inputs such as the
cable networks (for example, NBC) that it carries on its service--Congress
specifically empowered the FCC to ensure that vertically integrated cable
companies could not deny their competitors access to certain networks.' 2' The
statutory language specifically regulated "satellite-delivered" programming,
but remained silent on whether the FCC was also authorized to regulate programming delivered terrestrially to the cable head-end.' 22 The FCC initially
determined that this silence meant that terrestrially delivered signals were ex'23
empt from this rule-the "terrestrial loophole."'

114. See infra notes 131-138 and accompanying text.
115. See generally Dogan & Lemley, supra note 71 (discussing regulatory capture and
Trinko).
116. See, e.g., 2007 Program Access Rules, supra note 78, at 17,843-44 para. 77 (noting
that the record "does not provide sufficient evidence" to justify an FCC rule prohibiting certain vertically integrated cable firms from denying programming to rival MVPDs).
117. See Philadelphia Order, supra note 100, at 749 para. 5 (noting that the gap in FCC
authority "is commonly referred to as the 'terrestrial loophole'"); infra Section II.B. .
118. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460. I refer to this legislation as the "Cable Act" throughout this Note.
119. Id. § 628.
120. See S. REP. No. 102-92, at 24 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1157
(noting that competitive concerns are "exacerbated by the increased vertical integration in the
cable industry").
121. Id. § 628(c)(2).
122. See infra note 136 and accompanying text. A cable "head-end" is a central station
that collects and distributes cable network programming to cable subscribers. Head-ends receive their programming feeds via satellite or fiber-optic cable and distribute these signals to
nearby cable subscribers through cable wires. A cable company will maintain one head-end to
serve thousands of subscribers. For example, a single head-end might serve all of one cable
company's subscribers in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
123. Philadelphia Order, supra note 100, at 749 para. 5 (describing the history of the
terrestrial loophole).
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The significance of the terrestrial loophole was not lost on vertically integrated cable firms. Some firms used the terrestrial loophole to deny
competing firms access to certain "must-have" channels. 2 4 Most prominent-

ly, in 1997 Comcast denied its Direct Broadcast Satellite ("DBS") rivals
access to its wholly owned subsidiary, Comcast SportsNet Philadelphia,
which carries local sports games for Philadelphia's professional baseball,
has long recognized that such
basketball, and hockey teams. 12' The FCC
26
refusals to deal may harm competition.

Despite several findings that the terrestrial loophole harmed competition,
the FCC moved slowly to close the loophole.

27

The FCC first considered

the matter in 1998 when it evaluated the effectiveness of its program access
rules, including the terrestrial loophole. 28 At that time-only one year after
Comcast first denied DBS firms access to its Philadelphia sports channelthe FCC found no evidence that the terrestrial loophole caused competitive

harm.' 29 In 2000, the FCC denied an administrative complaint brought by
the DBS firms seeking access to Comcast's Philadelphia sports content. 30

The FCC again noted the apparent lack of competitive harm and also disclaimed statutory authority to regulate.'
By 2002, however, the
Commission concluded that the refusal to deal may have reduced competi-

tion in Philadelphia.

32

Nonetheless, the FCC reiterated that it did not

124. See, e.g.,
Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 17 FCC Rcd. 12,124, 12,150 para. 55 (2002) (report & order) [hereinafter
2002 Program Access Rules] ("The withholding of programming from competitors as a competitive tactic also has been evidenced by the acquisition of such rights in terrestrial-delivered
content not covered by the statutory restriction." (footnote omitted)). The FCC especially
noted (1)cases brought by DIRECTV and EchoStar (now DISH Network) against Comcast
and (2) a case brought by overbuilder RCN against Cablevision. Id. para. 55 n. 182.
125. See THIRTEENTH MVPD REPORT, supra note 93, at 723 tbl. C-3 (noting Comcast
SportsNet Philadelphia's launch dates as October 1997); DIRECTV, Inc., 15 FCC Rcd.
22,802, 22,805 para. 7 (2000) (mem. opinion & order) [hereinafter DIRECTV Order], aff'd
sub nom. EchoStar Commc'ns Corp. v. FCC, 292 F.3d 749 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting that Comcast SportsNet Philadelphia had been denied to certain competitors).
126. See, e.g., 2002 Program Access Rules, supra note 124, at 12, 139 para. 33 n.107,
12,152 para. 59 (concluding, after reviewing Comcast's behavior in Philadelphia, that the
evidence "tends to confirm that, where permitted, vertically integrated programmers will use
foreclosure of programming to provide a competitive edge to their affiliated cable operators").
127. See Philadelphia Order, supra note 100, at 793 para. 70 (closing the loophole with
respect to Comcast SportsNet Philadelphia in particular); supra note 125 and accompanying text.
128. Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act
of 1992, 13 FCC Rcd. 15,822, 15,852-57 paras. 63-71 (1998) (report & order) [hereinafter
1998 Program Access Rules].
129. Id. at 15,856-57 para. 71.
130. DIRECTV Order,supra note 125, at 22,807 para. 13.
131. Id. at 22,807 paras. 12-13 (approving a lower ruling that the refusal to deal in Philadelphia did not constitute unfair or anticompetitive behavior).
132. 2002 Program Access Rules, supra note 124, at 12,151 para. 59 ("[Wjhere permitted [by the terrestrial loophole], vertically integrated programmers will use foreclosure of
programming to provide a competitive edge to their affiliated cable operators." (footnote omit-
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believe it had sufficient statutory authority.'33 The FCC also found harm to

competition in two proceedings in 2006'" and 2007,135 but again declined
to prohibit the conduct, citing lack of statutory authority. 13 6 Cognizant of
the harm, however, in 2007 the FCC initiated a rulemaking proceeding to
determine whether it had the statutory authority to close the terrestrial

loophole. 3 7 Finding it did possess the requisite authority, the FCC finally
closed the loophole in 2010,138 thirteen years after Comcast first denied

service and eight years after the FCC first concluded that the conduct may
harm competition. 13 9
The terrestrial loophole saga suggests that some regulatory regimes
charged with protecting competition move slowly, if at all. Competitive

abuses may go unchecked in the interim, allowing firms engaging in
anticompetitive activities to reap large rewards. If firms are to be deterred

from considering abuse of slow-moving regulatory processes, they must
face the risk of a financial penalty that exceeds any anticompetitive gains.
2. FCC Cable Television Regulations Provide
Inadequate Deterrence

Some regulatory antitrust regimes suffer from the inability to impose calibrated damages to punish past anticompetitive behavior. In many industries,

ted)). The Commission cites low DBS penetration rates in Philadelphia as evidence of the
harm to competition. See id. at 12,139 para. 33 n.107.
133. Id. at 12,157-58 paras. 71-74 (declining to extend the program access rules to terrestrially delivered programming).
134. Adelphia Order, supra note 96, at 8,270-72 paras. 146-151, 8,347-50 app. D paras.
23, 28 tbl.A-2. The FCC's econometric estimates suggested that Comcast earned between $2.3
million and $2.7 million in excess profits annually as a result of its Philadelphia input foreclosure strategy. Id. at 8,349 app. D para. 28 tbl.A-2.
135. See 2007 Program Access Rules, supra note 78, at 17,817 para. 39 (citing evidence
from Philadelphia to support the conclusion that access to sports programming like Comcast
SportsNet Philadelphia "is necessary for competition in the video distribution market to remain viable").
136. Id. at 17,859-60 para. 115; see also id. at 17,796-97 para. 6 (noting the Commission's earlier interpretation that it lacked statutory authority); Adelphia Order, supra note 96,
at 8,274 n.525, 8,275 para. 163. Commissioner Michael Copps dissented from the Adelphia
Order, arguing that it "inexplicably leaves out Philadelphia." Id. at 8,367 (dissenting statement
of Comm'r Michael J. Copps).
137. 2007 Program Access Rules, supra note 78, at 17,860-61 para. 116.
138. Philadelphia Order, supra note 100, at 749-50 para. 6 (establishing rules covering
certain terrestrially delivered programming).
139. The Commission's delay from 2007 to 2010 is more understandable in light of the
significant time required to develop the record for a notice-and-comment rulemaking. Nevertheless, the Commission still significantly delayed the process by waiting until 2007 to initiate
the rulemaking that asserted statutory authority. See generally 2007 Program Access Rules,
supra note 78 (initiating proceedings); 1998 Program Access Rules, supra note 128 (declining
to initiate proceedings).
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and energy,1 41 regulators have the ability to

impose monetary penalties. However, regulatory fines are often standardized
in a one-size-fits-all matrix. 142 As a result, regulatory fines may be insensitive to the extent to which punished conduct harms competitors and
consumers. 143 By comparison, both public and private antitrust lawsuits allow parties to seek damages calibrated to the level of harm inflicted."4

The inability of regulatory regimes to impose adequate monetary damages, and thus to singlehandedly perform the punitive and deterrence

functions of antitrust, is aptly demonstrated by the FCC's cable agreement
proceedings, 145 which are governed by the Commission's "program access"
146
and "program carriage" rules (collectively, the "programming rules").
This process uses an administrative law process to impose access and pricing terms on cable companies (such as Time Warner Cable) and networks

140. See, e.g., Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 404-05 (2004) (noting that the FCC and New York Public Service Commission both
imposed fines ($3 million and $10 million, respectively) related to Verizon's purported violation of sharing obligations).
141. See Robert B. Martin III, Note, Sherman Shorts Out: The Dimming of Antitrust
Enforcement in the California Energy Crisis, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 300 (2003) (discussing
the inadequacy of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's refunding authority).
142. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(b)(4) note § 1 (2010) (providing the FCC's matrix).
143. For example, the Civil Aviation Board had "no power to award damages or to bring
criminal prosecutions" of antitrust violations within its purview. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.
v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 311 (1963). Telecommunications rules are heterogeneous.
Most regulatory proceedings set clear statutory penalty maxima. See infra notes 171-173 and
accompanying text. Some proceedings, such as the cable carriage proceedings noted in the
text, authorize additional "appropriate remedies." Carriage Agreement Proceedings, 47 C.F.R.
§ 76.1302(g)(1)-(2). The statute clearly specifies equitable relief, but may upon some readings
allow for the imposition of damage-like monetary awards as well. See id. (allowing "appropriate remedies, including, if necessary" injunctive relief, and thus providing a non-exhaustive
list of remedies (emphasis added)).
144. See generally Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 338-39
(1971) (holding that a plaintiff is entitled "to recover not only those damages which he has
suffered at the date of accrual, but also those which he will suffer in the future from the particular invasion"); PITOFSKY, GOLDSCHMID & WOOD, supra note 107, at 55, 75, 93-96
(discussing (1) public agencies' ability to seek either disgorgement or double damages under
the Criminal Fine Improvements Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d), and (2) private litigants'
right to seek damages up to three times the actual damages); Hovenkamp, supra note 109, at 4
(illustrating his argument that "[olptimal deterrence is a function of the anticipated profitability of conduct to a violator" by arguing that the anticipated penalty for anticompetitive
conduct that yields $100 should be "something greater than $100").
145. 47 C.FR. § 76.1302.
146. The program access and program carriage rules are two sides of the same coin. The
program access rules govern an MVPD's ability to access programming owned by rival
MVPDs, whereas the program carriage rules govern an unaffiliated programmer's right to
access an MVPD's network. A duty to deal may arise separately in antitrust; in the FCC's
regulatory setting, it specifically arises under the "non-discrimination" prong of the program
access and program carriage rules. See Prohibited Practices, 47 C.F.R. § 76.1301(c). These
rules are typically enforced by carriage agreement proceedings before an FCC AL. See infra
notes 147-152 and accompanying text.
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(such as CNN) that dispute the terms of access. 147 The programming rules
developed in response to concerns that vertically integrated cable firms were
148

demanding onerous and anticompetitive conditions on their counterparties.

The process has been updated and expanded several times, most recently in
2010.149

Complainants prevailing in cable programming proceedings are authorized to seek injunctive relief imposing "mandatory carriage ...or the
establishment of prices, terms, and conditions" of carriage. 150 Any such remedy may be imposed in addition to the FCC's penalties and remedies.' 51
Prevailing complainants may not, however, seek damage awards to "make [a
complainant] whole" from a defendant's anticompetitive conduct. 5 2 The
FCC's Media Bureau has concluded that no authority "expressly provide[s]
for the award of damages," a finding that the FCC has not disturbed.153 Although an ongoing FCC rulemaking procedure may eventually decide the
issue, 154 the terrestrial loophole saga discussed above suggests that, even if the
FCC does ultimately find statutory authority, any such discovery may be years
in the future. In the meantime, FCC programming adjudications have yet to

147. 47 C.F.R. § 76.1302 (establishing and prescribing the procedure for cable "carriage
agreement proceedings").
148. See Adelphia Order, supra note 96, at 8,227-28 para. 43 (describing the foundations of the program carriage complaint process).
149. For example, the process was significantly streamlined in 2006 when the FCC imposed a parallel complaint process for complaints against Comcast and Time Warner Cable
which, unlike the existing system, required a decision within 165 days of the filing of a complaint. See id. at 8,786 para. 190. See generally Philadelphia Order, supra note 100, at 777-97
paras. 46-75 (describing the 2010 extension of the program access complaint process to cover
terrestrially delivered programming).
150. 47 C.F.R. § 76.1302(g)(1).
151. Id. § 7.6.1302(g)(2).
152. TCR Sports Broad. Holding, L.L.P, 23 FCC Rcd. 15,783, 15,814 para. 54 (2008)
(order on review) [hereinafter TCR Sports II,
rev'd, 25 FCC Rcd. 18,099 (2010) (mem. opinion & order) [hereinafter TCR Sports II]. But see 47 C.F.R. § 76.1003(d) (providing for
damages in program access proceedings). Although many program access complaints have
been filed, none have to date resulted in an award of damages under 76.1003(d).
153. See TCR Sports I, supra note 152, at 15,815 para. 54. The full Commission reversed the Media Bureau's decision on liability grounds, and thus did not necessarily have
occasion to consider whether damages were authorized under any applicable authority.
154. See Leased Commercial Access, 22 FCC Rcd. 11,222, 11,228 para. 18 (2007)
(seeking comment on "any other issues that would properly inform our program carriage inquiry"); Comments of TCR Sports Broadcasting Holding, L.L.P. at 2, Amendment of Certain
of the Comm'n's Part 1 Rules of Practice and Procedure and Part 0 Rules of Comm'n Org.,
GC Docket No. 10-44 (May 10, 2010) (responding to the FCC's request for comments by
seeking a "clarification that monetary damages are available for past discriminatory withholding of carriage"); Letter from Neal M. Goldberg, Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, to Marlene
H. Dortsch, Sec'y, FCC 4 (July 30, 2010) (on file with the FCC as a comment to GC Docket
Number 10-44) (opposing TCR Sports's request and arguing that "[t]he FCC has no authority
to assess damages payable to a complainant in these [program carriage] cases").
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award damages (or any other monetary award) to a successful complain55
ant.1

Without damages, vertically integrated cable operators have ample incentive to discriminate against unaffiliated regional programmers, especially

regional sports networks ("RSNs") that carry local sporting events.156 This
incentive arises due to cable operators' dominance in local markets. Cable
operators have "clustered" their networks to such an extent that they often
serve at least 60 percent-and sometimes more than 90 percent-of MVPD
subscribers in a given television market, such as Boston, Charlotte, or Philadelphia. 157 Because an RSN's audience consists entirely of a sports team's
"home" television market-Philadelphia Phillies games are only important
to Philadelphia fans, and by league rule cannot be shown in other teams'
markets such as New York City or Baltimore15---cable operators are also the
"make-or-break" customer for RSNs. 159 Economic models suggest that cable
operators have a variety of incentives to deny carriage to unaffiliated RSNs,
which may include the incentive to force the RSN out of business, acquire
its assets, and deny the "must-have" regional sports programming to rival
cable and satellite firms. 6 ' A variety of economic analyses suggest that

denying upstream regional sports programming to rivals grants a cable firm
additional market power in the downstream cable industry.' 6 ' Indeed, the
155. See TCR Sports I, supra note 152, at 15,814-15 para. 54 (disclaiming authority to
award damages to prevailing complainant). Several other complaints were filed and later settled before a carriage complaint decision had been issued. See, e.g., TCR Sports Broad.
Holding, L.L.P., 21 FCC Rcd. 8,989, 8,996 para. 16 (2006) (mem. opinion & hearing designation
order) (designating the case for a hearing); John Eggerton, Comcast, MASN Settle CarriageDispute: RSN Says Orioles, Nationals Will Receive Carriage 'As Early As 2010', MULTICHANNEL
NEWS, Dec. 23, 2009, http://www.multichannel.com/article/441670-ComcastMASNSettle_
Carriage.Dispute.php?rssid =20527&q=masn (announcing the predecision settlement).
156. For the rather less common view that unaffiliated programmers also may engage in
anticompetitive behavior, see David Waterman, Vertical Integration and Program Access in
the Cable Television Industry, 47 FED. COMM. L.J. 511 (1995).
157. See, e g., Adelphia Order, supra note 96, at 8349-50 app. D para. 28 tbl.A-2 (listing
postacquisition market shares for Comcast or Time Warner in most major television markets in
the United States). According to these figures, Comcast serves 94.4% of all subscribers in the
Boston Designated Market Area ("DMA") and 80.9% of all subscribers in the Philadelphia
DMA. Id. Time Warner, the dominant firm in the Charlotte DMA, serves 63.8% of all subscribers in that market. Id.
158. See generally id. at 8,259 paras. 125-26 (discussing the regional market for RSNs
due, in part, to teams' "authorized viewing zones," and limiting the defined market to the
"inner" viewing zone because that zone comprises the home team's city and most interested
fan base).
159. Id. at 8,284-88 paras. 180-91 (discussing program carriage issues, agreeing with
commenters that Comcast and Time Warner Cable possess "make or break" power over unaffiliated RSNs, and adopting leased access regulations as an attempt to address competitive
issues).
160. See, e.g., Hal J.Singer & J. Gregory Sidak, Vertical Foreclosurein Video Programming Markets: Implicationsfor Cable Operators,6 REV. NETWORK ECON. 372, 373 (2007)
(describing this theory of foreclosure).
161. For a review of the literature, see id. (noting studies by academics, the GAO, and
the FCC).

Unfit for Prime Time

December 2011]

FCC itself believes that dominant local cable firms have the "incentive and
162
ability" to discriminate against RSNs.
The unavailability of damages in FCC program carriage proceedings only reinforces a dominant cable firm's "incentive and ability" to deny
program carriage to an unaffiliated network. If the FCC rules against the
cable firm, that firm need only pay the market rate set by the FCC, which
presumably is the "fair price" that it would have paid absent any discrimination. Even if it loses, the cable firm is not required to pay any penalties or
damages for the period during which it "should" have carried the network
(that is, during the length of the FCC proceeding, which may take several
years). If the cable firm wins, it can demand a lower price or refuse to carry
the channel altogether. Faced with no penalty for losing and considerable
reward for winning, vertically integrated cable firms have plenty of incentive
to deny now and litigate later.
3. Damages Are Key Adequate Deterrence
The FCC's programming rules demonstrate that, without the ability to
impose damages, regulatory action alone is insufficient to achieve optimal
deterrence. The ability to seek damages-even treble damages-is an im16 3
portant element of both the punitive and deterrence functions of antitrust.
Even antitrust scholars who question the efficacy of treble damages tend to
support the imposition of damages sufficient to compensate for any actual
losses arising out of the anticompetitive conduct. 16' At first glance, the
FCC's programming rules
appear to be an archetypical form of Trinko's
"effective regulation": 165 they include both a sharing obligation and a pricesetting mechanism, just like the telephone regulations in Trinko. 166 If even
the relatively strong programming rules cannot impose adequate monetary
penalties, relatively few regulatory regimes may provide Trinko's "antitrust
function."
Several commentators have suggested that regulation can adequately
perform the antitrust function when regulators are free to assess forfeiture
penalties. This view was expressed most prominently by the Court in Trinko,
where it found that the prompt "impos[ition of] a substantial fine"-$13
162. Adelphia Order, supra note 96, at 8,267 para. 140, 8,284 para. 181 (noting that a
cable acquisition making Comcast and Time Warner even more dominant would increase their
"incentive and ability" to discriminate against MVPDs and unaffiliated programmers (such as
MASN)).
163. See, e.g., Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 575-

76 (1982) ("[T]reble damages serve as a means of deterring antitrust violations and of compensating victims .... ").
164. See, e.g., Harvey J. Goldschmid, Comment on the Policy Implications of the
Georgetown Study, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION 412 (Lawrence J. White ed., 1988).
165. See infra note 167 and accompanying text for a discussion of Trinko and effective
regulation.
166. See supra note 150 and accompanying text for an account of remedies available

under the programming rules.
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million-and threat of "specific penalties for failure" demonstrated that "the

regime was an effective steward of the antitrust function."'67 The Court

credited the FCC's account of the threatened follow-on penalties 6 s as "a
strong financial incentive for post-entry compliance ... [that] prevented

backsliding."' 69 The Court's decision in Trinko, and its view of regulation
as an effective substitute for antitrust law, hinges on the extent to which
regulators can impose sanctions calibrated to deter future anticompetitive
behavior by regulated entities.
Despite the Court's rosy view of regulatory penalties, most regulators
simply do not have the statutory authority to impose penalties that bear any
relationship to the extent of harm to competition. The limits of regulatory
authority are particularly evident in the FCC's application of the very same
forfeiture rules exalted in Trinko. As noted by the Court, the Telecommunications Act allows for "forfeiture" penalties for violations of Commission
rules. 7 ° Importantly, however, the statute specifies forfeiture maxima,' 7'
which govern the FCC's inflation-adjusted penalty schedule.172 For example,
a willful violation of the cable program access rules-which include the
terrestrial loophole regulations discussed above-carries a maximum forfeiture penalty of $7,500 per violation.' 73 Eleven aggravating and mitigating
factors, including "substantial harm" and "substantial economic gain," guide
the FCC's choice. 174 Despite their apparent interest in competitive concerns,
the relatively low statutory caps on fines suggest that the
FCC's forfeiture
75
provisions cannot be tailored to deter competitive harms. 1
Because the statutory maximum penalty provisions appear facially inadequate, the FCC has used creative methods to avoid consideration of the
statutory penalty maxima when it believes competition has been harmed.
For example, in October 2002 the Commission fined SBC (Verizon's predecessor) $6 million for the violation of certain network sharing regulations in
167. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 413
(2004).
168. Specifically, the FCC had the authority to suspend or revoke Verizon's "longdistance approval." Id.
169. Id. (quoting Application by Bell Atl. N.Y. for Authorization under Section 271 of
the Communications Act, 15 FCC Rcd. 3,953, 3,958-59, paras. 8, 12 (1999) (mem. opinion &

order)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
170.

47 U.S.C. § 503 (2006).

171. See id.
172. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(b)(4) note § 1 (2010) (providing "guidelines" consistent with
the statutory maxima, including $7,500 penalties for violations of the cable program access
rules, cable cross-ownership rules, and cable broadcast carriage rules); Amendment of Section
1.80(b) of the Commission's Rules, 15 FCC Rcd. 18,221 (adopted Sept. 14, 2000) (to be codi-

fied at 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(b)) (increasing the statutory fines to account for inflation).
173. 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(b)(4) note § 1. This "note," entitled "Guidelines for Assessing
Forfeitures," provides a table with more than 40 specified maximum penalties for different
violations of FCC regulations. Id.
174. Id. note § 2 ("Adjustment Criteria for Section 503 Forfeitures").
175.

Unless, of course, the magnitude of harm is appropriate for small-claims court.
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five Midwestern states. 76 The FCC penalty schedule prescribed a maximum
fine of $120,000 per day, up to an overall maximum of $1.2 million "for any
single act or failure to act.' ' 177 Finding that the violation in question impacted competition (a plus factor under the FCC's penalty schedule), the FCC
assessed the maximum $1.2 million fine. However, perhaps finding this
meager sum inadequate given the competitive harm and one-year duration
of the violation, the FCC found five parallel $1.2 million violations of its
regulations--one for each state where SBC did not provide the required service-for a total fine of $6 million. 178 The FCC found that this ad hoc fine
was "not excessive" because "a smaller forfeiture would lack adequate deterrent effect."17 9 Yet subsequent FCC statements indicate that the fine was
not calibrated to the level of harm but rather represented "the statutory max1 80
imum for the violations at issue."
The FCC's attempts to expand the magnitude of its regulatory penalties
demonstrate the inadequacy of the regulatory penalty provisions celebrated
in Trinko. Despite the FCC's explicit authority to consider harm to competition when setting its fines, these fines still cannot exceed the statutory
maxima and thus cannot be calibrated to punish any conduct with effects of
a magnitude greater than a few million dollars. The incentive is clear: if you
engage in anticompetitive conduct, think big, because the fines will pale in
comparison with the rewards. As the FCC's SBC case indicates, the Commission has sought to address this limitation through ad hoc measures on at
least one occasion, finding five violations for engaging in the same conduct
in five states.' 8' Yet there are clear limits to the FCC's ability to stretch this
principle if its judgments are to survive appellate review. If, for example, the
FCC determined that only a $30 million fine would deter anticompetitive
activity, it would need to find twenty-five parallel violations. Such manipulations undermine the FCC's stated purpose for defining specific maximum
8
penalties: predictability. 1
The unpredictability of FCC penalties cuts especially strongly against
those scholars who have argued that, because regulation provides defendants
greater certainty, regulation must supplant judicially enforced antitrust

176. SBC Commc'ns, Inc., 17 FCC Rcd. 19,923, 19,934-37 paras. 22-28 (2002) (forfeiture order), aff'd sub. nom SBC Commc'ns Inc. v. FCC, 373 F.3d 140 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
177. 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(b)(2) (2002). Note that the penalty schedule has been revised since
2002; the current maximum penalty is $325,000 per day for a total of $3,000,000. 47 C.F.R.
§ 1.80(b)(2) (2010).
178. SBC Commc'ns, 17 FCC Rcd. at 19,934-37 paras. 22-27 (2002).
179. Id. at 19,935 para. 24.
180. InPhonic, Inc., 22 FCC Rcd. 8,689, 8,702 para. 30 (2007) (order of forfeiture &
further notice of apparent liability for forfeiture).
181. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (assessing five parallel violations
against SBC).
182. Forfeiture Proceedings, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,474, 43,474 para. 2 (1997) ("The Commission agreed with the majority that guidelines would add a measure of predictability and
uniformity to the forfeiture process.").
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law.'83 The standard argument is well stated by Professor Thorne, who finds
the regulatory regime approved in Trinko eminently reasonable because it
was "flexible ...in designing performance measures[] with accompanying
levels of penalties .

. . ."14 Professor

Thorne argues that antitrust litigation,

by contrast, should be disfavored because it entails "vague legal standards
...and uncertain litigation" that would overdeter anticompetitive conduct.185 Yet it is unclear how the FCC's method of avoiding the statutory
penalty cap is any less "vague" or "uncertain." Nor is it clear why regulatory
underdeterrence is preferable to litigation-induced overdeterrence. It is only
clear that such manipulations are legal.'86
Moreover, the interaction between slow-moving regulation and inadequate regulatory fines only exacerbates the lack of deterrence inherent in
the FCC's cable regulations. As noted above, regulatory fines are often
inadequate to deter all but the very smallest competitive harms. Regulatory
inaction-perhaps exemplified by the FCC's thirteen-year quest to close
the terrestrial loophole-only lengthens the duration (and thus the magnitude) of competitive harm. Trinko is perhaps unique in the brevity of the
challenged conduct, which occurred over a period of fewer than three
years.' 8 7 By comparison, the competitive harms associated with the terrestrial loophole extended for thirteen years. 188 The FCC's regulatory fines
are inadequate for even small harms of short duration; they are an even
more inadequate remedy for competitive harms extended due to the FCC's
relative inaction. And they are surely inadequate to meet Trinko's requirement that they "deter and remedy anticompetitive harm"' 89 and Credit
Suisse's caveat that regulation may displace antitrust law if regulators "actively enforce[] the rules and regulations that forbid the conduct in
question."' 190

183. But cf Jacob A. Kling, Note, Securities Regulation in the Shadow of the Antitrust
Laws: The Case for a Broad Implied Immunity Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 910, 938-39 (2011)
(arguing that regulation provides greater certainty than judicially enforced antitrust law).
184. Thorne, supra note 11, at 301.

185.

Id. at 300.

186. See, e.g., SBC Commc'ns Inc. v. FCC, 373 F.3d 140, 151-52 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (approving the FCC's $6 million dollar fine and finding that the penalty was not arbitrary and
capricious).
187. Verizon's interconnection obligations with AT&T began in 1997. Verizon
Commc'ns v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 402 (2004). Competitors
complained of problems with Verizon's order system in 1999, id. at 403, and the matter was
resolved by the FCC and New York Public Service Commission by mid-2000, id. at 403--04.
188.
189.
190.
added).

See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 399 (emphasis added).
See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 283 (2007) (emphasis
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HI. PROPOSED SOLUTION: TRINKO AND CREDIT SUISSE SHOULD OUST
ANTITRUST LAW ONLY WHERE REGULATORY PENALTIES
ARE SUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN COMPETITION

The inadequacy of the FCC's cable regulations demonstrates the need
for a continued role for antitrust law in the cable competition regime. Yet,
given the Court's concern with overlapping antitrust and regulatory regimes,
clear rules are necessary to determine when Trinko and its siblings really do
oust antitrust law from regulated industries. This Part suggests the following
clarification to the Court's new approach: Trinko and its siblings should be
construed as ousting antitrust law only where regulatory penalties are sufficient to eliminate monopoly rents and deter anticompetitive conduct. That
is, courts should look at the extent and actual effectiveness of potential regulations before concluding that they "perform the antitrust function." As
urged by Trinko, any such inquiry should be individualized to the particularities of the industry, including the regulator's authority to impose
remedies. 191
A. Applying the ProposedSolution to the Cable Industry

This Section tests the proposed solution by applying it to the cable industry. First, Section III.A. 1 compares the regulatory regimes examined in
Trinko and its siblings to cable regulations. Finding the cable regulations
substantially weaker, Section II.A.2 concludes that the proposed rule would
decline to apply Trinko and its siblings to the cable industry. Given the
weakness of cable regulations, declining to apply Trinko and its siblings is
probably the correct result.
1. Different Competitive and Regulatory Facts
The regulatory regime in Trinko and its siblings differ from those in cable television industry in three respects: (1) the activity (or inactivity) of the
regulator; (2) the regulatory remedies available to regulators and injured
parties; and (3) the scope of the sharing obligation imposed. First, the FCC
has been far more passive in the cable space than regulators have been in
other areas such as telephone and securities. As noted above in Section
I.C.2, Trinko and Credit Suisse imply that a regulator is an effective "steward of the antitrust function" only when it (1) acts quickly to remedy
competitive harms 19 2 and (2) "has continuously exercised its legal authority

191. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411 ("[A]ntitrust analysis must sensitively recognize and
reflect the distinctive economic and legal setting of the regulated industry to which it applies."
(alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Town of Concord v. Bos. Edison Co., 915
F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
192. See id. at 413 (noting that the FCC responded "soon," that the New York Public
Service Commission responded "even earlier," and that such action performed the antitrust
function).
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to regulate" the challenged conduct.193 Those facts simply are not present in
the cable industry. Although the FCC has clear regulations that provide for
timely adjudication of program access complaints, 9 4 it has not always acted
within the required time.'95 And-as the terrestrial loophole saga
indicates-the FCC has not continuously exercised its (newfound) legal
authority, 196 a key requirement under Credit Suisse.'97
Second, the regulatory remedies available to litigants in cable proceedings are far more limited than those the Court has found sufficient to
displace antitrust remedies. Whereas the Court in Credit Suisse emphasized
that "private litigants" successfully used securities statutes to "obtain[] damages,"' 98 the FCC interprets the program access rules to bar damages. 199
Similarly, the Court in Trinko emphasized that regulators could withdraw
operating licenses, 00 which provided "a strong financial incentive for ...
compliance." '' In the cable realm, by contrast, the FCC has never threatened to revoke cable licenses for cable programming rule violations. In
short, Trinko and its siblings relied on far more muscular regulatory remedies than those available to litigants in cable programming cases. Because
the FCC's meager regulatory fines have proven inadequate to deter vertical
foreclosure of cable inputs-a fact the FCC has itself recognized2°"-Trinko
193.

See Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 277.

194. See generally Carriage Agreement Proceedings, 47 C.F.R. § 76.1302 (2010) (setting
specific time limits on the filing, answering, and adjudicating of program access complaints).
195. See, e.g., Herring Broad., Inc., 74 Fed. Reg. 3,037, 3,037 para. 2 (Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n Jan. 16, 2009) (notice) (finding that the ALJ assigned to adjudicate five program
access complaints failed to act within the required sixty-day period); NFL Enters. LLC, 74
Fed. Reg. 4,035, 4,035 para. 2 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n Jan. 22, 2009) (notice) (finding that
the ALI assigned to adjudicate the program access complaint failed to act within the required
sixty-day period).
196. See supra Part II.B.I.
197. Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 277.
198. Id. (discussing the availability and use of damage recoveries for similar securitiesspecific causes of action).
199. See TCR Sports I, supra note 152 at 15,814-15 para. 54. The full Commission
reversed the Media Bureau's decision on liability grounds, and thus did not necessarily have
occasion to consider whether damages were authorized under any applicable authority. TCR
Sports II, supra note 152 at 18,099 para. 1.
200. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 413
(2004) ("[A] failure to meet an authorization condition can result ...in the suspension or
revocation of long-distance approval.").
201. Id. (quoting Application by Bell Atl. N.Y. for Authorization under Section 271, 15
FCC Rcd. 3,953, 3,958 para. 8 (1999) (mem. opinion & order)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
202. See, e.g., Adelphia Order, supra note 96, at 8,264 para. 134 (noting a commentator's
assertion that "the use of exclusive distribution agreements that foreclose competing MVPDs
from access to the programming ...is already done"); id. at 8270 para. 146 (affirming a
commentator's assertion by noting that "It]here are three [television markets] where the games
of some of the local professional sports teams are not available to DBS subscribers: Charlotte,
Philadelphia, and San Diego"). The FCC has also acknowledged that its existing regulations
are inadequate by using merger conditions, rather than universally applicable regulations, to
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and its siblings should not foreclose all manner of antitrust suits, and in par23

ticular should not prevent suits that do not allege a regulatory duty to deal. 1
Third, the scope of the sharing obligation imposed by cable regulations
differs fundamentally from the scope of the sharing obligations at issue in
Trinko and Linkline. The regulations in both Trinko and Linkline arose under
the Telecommunications Act, which the Court noted "imposes a large number of duties upon incumbent [local exchange carriers]-aboveand beyond

those basic responsibilities it imposes upon all carriers.'' 204 By contrast, the
Cable Act's program access rules apply universally to large and small cable
firms. 20 The type of product and the identity of the regulatory beneficiary
also differ. Whereas Trinko and Linkline both required incumbents (who
were previously regulated monopolists) to provide certain inputs that are not
sold at retail to their horizontal competitors, 2 6 the FCC's program access
rules govern the terms of sale of inputs-cable programmning-sold at retail
to firms' downstream customers."7 As illustrated8 in Trinko, the Court ap20
pears to place substantial weight on both factors.
2. Courts Should Decline to Apply Trinko and Its
Siblings to the Cable Industry
Given its weaknesses, courts should decline to apply Trinko and its siblings to the cable industry. As noted above in Section III.A. 1, the remedies

available to cable regulators simply do not compare in kind or strength to
those available to the regulators overseeing the telephone (Trinko), internet
(Linkline), and securities (Credit Suisse) industries. And as the terrestrial
address competitive harms involving vertical foreclosure of sports programming. See, e.g., id.
8,269 para. 144, 8,274 para. 156 (finding a risk of harm in fifteen television markets absent
merger-specific regulations).
203. For example, an unaffiliated programmer could allege an antitrust duty to deal that
does not arise from regulation. Under Trinko and especially Credit Suisse, regulation appears
to bar any antitrust claims, not just those arising out of a regulatory duty to deal. See Credit
Suisse, 551 U.S. at 279 (holding that "securities law and antitrust law are clearly incompatible," and thus that securities law preempts antitrust law); Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412 (dictum).
204. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 405 (emphasis added). The Court in particular highlighted an
incumbent's "UNE" sharing obligation as a special Telecommunications Act-imposed duty.
Id. at 405-06.
205. See generally Carriage Agreement Proceedings, 47 C.F.R. § 76.1302 (2010).
206. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 403-06 (noting that the regulatory structure compelled sales of
UNEs to Verizon's horizontal "rivals"); Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commens, Inc., 129 S.
Ct. 1109, 1119 (2009) (analogizing to Trinko by noting that there was "no antitrust duty to
deal with its rivals at wholesale").
207. Programming is typically sold at retail under multi-year deals. See, e.g., Altitude
Sports Inks Carriage Agreement with Comeast, SPORTsBUSINEss DAILY (Nov. 8, 2004),
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/2004/1 llssue-40/Sports-Media/AltitudeSports-Inks-Carriage-Agreement-With-Comcast.aspx.
208. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409-10 (distinguishing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985), on the retail/wholesale distinction); id. at 402
(noting Verizon's status as an incumbent local exchange carrier whose former "exclusive franchise" was opened to competition by the telecommunications regulations at issue).
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loophole saga illustrates,20 9 the relatively weak cable regulations have proven unable to deter what the FCC itself deems to be anticompetitive
conduct-vertical foreclosure. 1 0 Considering that the Court has itself defined deterrence as the key "antitrust function,"2"' it would be inappropriate
to apply Trinko and its siblings to the cable television industry.
B. Qualification:Limiting Injunctive Relief
under the Antitrust Laws
Although it would be inappropriate to apply Trinko and its siblings to
the cable industry, allowing antitrust law to operate unfettered alongside
cable regulation might still violate the principles underlying Trinko and its
siblings in one important respect: it would risk exposing firms to conflicting
prospective mandates. This risk has long haunted the Court. For example,
the Court found in Credit Suisse that allowing antitrust laws to operate
alongside securities regulation risked "produc[ing] conflicting guidance,
requirements, duties, privileges, or standards of conduct." 212 Although the
Court did not identify any actual conflict, its rhetoric suggests a concern
with conflicting requirements on prospective action. Limiting injunctive
relief seems like the obvious solution. But, as noted above, the Court solved
this problem instead by preempting incompatible antitrust laws entirely." 3
Yet a concern with conflicting mandates cannot justify the Court's decision to mute antitrust suits for damages. Conceptually, an antitrust damage
award is compatible with regulatory action punishing the same behavior:
damages punish retrospectively, whereas regulatory punishments-apart
from those enforced by fines-are prospective requirements. The Court itself has recognized that a regulatory regime that preempts or otherwise
displaces an antitrust suit for injunctive relief does not displace an
antitrust suit for damages. 1 4 For example, the Court found as follows in Pan
American World Airlines, Inc. v. United States:
If it were clear that there [were] a [damages] remedy in this civil antitrust
suit that was not available in a § 411 proceeding before the [regulator], we
would have the kind of problem ... where litigation is held by a court until
the basic facts and findings are first determined by the administrative agen-

209. See supra Section II.B.1.
210. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
211. See supra Section II.A.
212. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v.Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 275-76 (2007).
213. Id. at 279 (finding that "securities law and antitrust law are clearly incompatible"
when applied to certain underwriting activities).
214. See Carnation Co. v. Pac. Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 224 (1966) (stating that the petitioner had "its choice" between antitrust and regulatory remedies); Far E.
Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574 (1952) (noting that facts found by competent
regulators may "serve as a premise for legal consequences to be judicially determined").
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cy, so that
the judicial remedy, not available in the other proceeding, can be
215
granted.
This precedent remains good law today.216 Thus a reading of Trinko that
preserves public and private suits for damages-at least when regulators
cannot impose suitable penalties-is consistent with the Court's prior statements. It also avoids (or at least mitigates) the risk of inconsistent
prospective remedies. Finally, it addresses potentially anticompetitive conduct in the cable industry in a far less intrusive and more calibrated manner
than other suggestions, such as discouraging vertical integration or requiring
217
Ala carte channel pricing.
CONCLUSION

Although Trinko and its siblings may individually be narrow, they collectively announce the Court's determination to displace antitrust law when
regulation "performs the antitrust function. ' 21 8 It would be a mistake to read
this mandate too broadly. Not all regulatory regimes can perform the antitrust function, which the Court has in the past defined as deterring and
punishing anticompetitive conduct. Regulations that cannot impose calibrated financial penalties or damages-including the FCC's cable programming
regulations-are particularly unsuitable substitutes for antitrust law. Antitrust law should retain a role in such circumstances. As AT&T, Otter Tail,
Standard Oil, and Terminal Railroad demonstrate, antitrust law complements even strong regulatory regimes. Recognizing its continuing role
would go a long way toward deterring anticompetitive conduct in the cable
television industry.

215.
216.
HERBERT

Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 313 n.19 (1963).
At least according to a leading antitrust treatise. See IA PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW U 244c3-c4 (3d ed. 2006).

217. See David Hutson, Note, Paying the Pricefor Sports TV: Preventing the Strategic
Misuse of the FCC's Carriage Regulations, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 407, 409 (2009) (suggesting

that Congress eliminate the FCC carriage proceedings and "discourage[] vertical integration
by cable companies or mov[e] to an h lacarte cable regime").
218. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 412
(2004) (quoting Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 358 (1963) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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